



INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

NEW PRC ETHNIC UNITY AND PROGRESS LAW ENFORCES ASSIMILATION OF TIBETANS, CONTRADICTS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

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March 13, 2026

On March 12, 2026, the National People's Congress (NPC) [passed](#) the [new law of the People's Republic of China on "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress."](#) The legislation advances a PRC strategy of demographic homogenization for Tibetans and other non-Chinese peoples behind anodyne language that ostensibly "helps better support people of all ethnic groups across the country in advancing national development and rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization." Several provisions in the law serve to legitimize Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies forcing Tibetans and others to assimilate into the CCP-defined "Chinese" nation, according to analysis by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). The law provides a legal tool for the CCP to establish and enforce a unified national identity and singular idea of China, shaped by CCP and authoritarian ideology. While the regulations refer to non-discrimination in recruitment and the right to criticize discriminatory practices, they impose a top-down vision of "ethnic unity" which upholds Chinese ethnic identity as the norm. Most importantly, and for the first time, the regulations represent an explicit legal departure from the principle of preferential treatment of people like Tibetans considered a "minority" as stipulated in the PRC Constitution and relevant laws.

The assertion of [a dominant ethnic culture violates international human rights law](#) and China's international human rights commitments, including provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which China ratified in 1981, and of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which China ratified in 1992. The regulations also violate the right to freely pursue social and cultural development, pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which China ratified in 2001. Furthermore, the law's international scope raises fears of an intensified strategy of transnational repression on the global stage perpetrated by the CCP against dissenting voices in other countries.

The law has significant ramifications for Tibet and the Tibetan people. Tibetans were an integral factor in the design of this law as evidenced by the similar ["Regulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region"](#) promulgated in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, and, in different iterations, at the sub-provincial level in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai provinces. ICT compared the text of this legislation with some of the regulations in Tibetan areas formulated in prior years and examined statements by current and former Chinese leaders on ethnic issues, as well as the "public debate" among CCP-aligned scholars on altering ethnic minority policies. The comparative analysis demonstrated that the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law is the culmination of a decades-long CCP effort to dilute the unique identity of the Tibetan people and codify forced assimilationist policies into the PRC's legal framework. A 2025 analysis by ICT shows how the CCP has used Tibet as a testing ground for the policy that led to this new law.

Reversal of CCP policy on “minority” ethnic groups

This law reverses the long-stated CCP commitment, dating to the era of Mao Zedong, to recognize the distinct culture and tradition of “ethnic minorities” through autonomous governance initiatives. Even before the establishment of the PRC, the CCP committed to addressing the issue of the non-Chinese “minority” communities through an autonomous governance system. In [October 1936, Mao Zedong’s then revolutionary government encouraged the establishment of the Yuwang Hui Autonomous Government](#), the first such governance system. The Hui are one of the 55 ethnic groups, along with Tibetans, recognized as a “minority” by the CCP. In September 1949, after assuming power, the CCP listed ethnic regional autonomy as a political system [in the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference](#).

Accordingly, the Constitution of the PRC provided the highest legal guarantee to “minority” ethnic communities by mandating that “[r]egional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority ethnicities live in concentrated communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the power of autonomy.”

Thus, at least on paper, the PRC governs Tibetans and other “minorities” under an autonomous structure with more privileges than the governance system in the majority Chinese areas, in order to preserve and promote their culture, religion, language and way of life. This policy was codified in [the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy](#). This Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law says: “The implementation of ethnic regional autonomy embodies the spirit of the state, fully respecting and guaranteeing the rights of various ethnic minorities to manage their own internal affairs.”

On a surface level, the “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” does not stipulate eliminating the autonomy system, yet its provisions directly or indirectly unravel and undermine both the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and the underlying constitutional guarantee. Consequently, in real terms, the Ethnic Unity and Progress law will override the PRC’s autonomy laws, including through redefining clauses to serve its policy of forced assimilation and advancing a homogenous Chinese nation.

Linguistic rights is one example of this troubling dynamic. According to the Constitution (Articles 4 and 121) and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (articles 10, 21, 37, 49), the Tibetan people have the right to preserve and promote the Tibetan language and PRC policy is supposed to support this. To guarantee the right of “ethnic minorities” to use their native spoken and written languages in legal proceedings, Article 11 of the [Civil Procedure Law](#) prescribes: “Citizens of all ethnic groups shall have the right to use their native spoken and written languages in civil proceedings. Where people of an ethnic minority live in a concentrated community or where a number of ethnic groups live together in one area, the people’s courts shall conduct hearings and issue legal documents in the spoken and written languages commonly used by the local ethnic groups. The people’s courts shall provide translations for any participant in the court proceedings who is not familiar with the spoken or written languages commonly used by the local ethnic groups.” The Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, however, reverses this commitment by providing leeway to Chinese authorities not to take any initiatives to promote the Tibetan language in Tibet. Article 15 of the Ethnic Unity and Progress law says the state shall promote written and spoken Chinese and, even if a non-Chinese language is to be used, the state should “give priority to the national standard spoken and written Chinese language and script.”

Redefining the role of ethnic groups in China

The “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” mandates that ethnic groups should now build a “community for the Chinese nation” and in the process make their own distinct identity and culture subservient to it. The preface of the law says that the CCP “has made forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation the main line of the Party’s ethnic work and the main focus of all work in ethnic minority areas.” This is further emphasized in Article 6, which says, “The sense of community for the Chinese nation is the foundation of national unity.”

The sense of community for the Chinese nation (中华民族共同体意识) is a political concept introduced by President Xi Jinping for a unified, shared identity among all ethnic groups. Making his objective clear [at the 2019 National Conference on Commending Models for Ethnic Unity and Progress](#), Xi Jinping mentioned that the “history of China is a history of the integration and convergence of various ethnic groups into a unified multi-ethnic Chinese nation, a history of all ethnic groups jointly creating, developing, and consolidating the great unified motherland,” In other words, the CCP’s ethnic theory and ethnic policy will now be a vehicle for the “Sinicization” of Tibetans and other non-Chinese communities. The Tibetan-specific objective was made clear when the head of the Chinese United Front Work Department, Li Ganjie, [met the CCP-selected Panchen Lama on February 12, 2026 in Beijing](#) and expressed the hope that he “would strengthen his sense of community for the Chinese nation and actively participate in the building of the Chinese nation as a community...”

With this change, ethnic groups within the PRC are tasked with obeying the leadership of the CCP as a principal means for advancing “ethnic unity.” Article 2 of the new law states: “The cause of ethnic unity and progress must adhere to the overall leadership of the Communist Party of China...” It continues saying, “This will consolidate the common ideological and political foundation for the unity and struggle of all ethnic groups and gather strength for building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation.”

Ethnic policy now directly linked to national security

While the PRC Constitution and the Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy focused on preserving and promoting distinct ethnic identities and traditions, the new law views minority communities including Tibetans solely through a national security lens. [Article 52](#) specifically lists “safeguard national security and social stability” among the responsibilities of governmental organs at all levels in its approach to ethnic communities. Xi Jinping has redefined “national security” to encompass all issues, and the new law gives a national security-centric approach to addressing ethnic issues. Article 50 of the law identifies safeguarding national security as a responsibility of the authorities in their approach to ethnic groups. This approach complements the PRC’s application of the [2015 National Security Law](#), which mandates “lawfully punishing activities that divide ethnicities to preserve social tranquility and the unity of the motherland in ethnic regions...,” and it legalizes the intent of the [National Security Education Guideline](#) announced in September 2020 to politically train an entire new generation of vigilant guards across China. The Guideline portrays minorities, including Tibetans and Uyghurs, as dangerous and untrustworthy. Members of minority communities are implied to be threats to national security, territorial integrity, national unity, political stability and social order.

Extraterritorial scope risks transnational repression

One of the most problematic features of the new law, in terms of the international community, is its extraterritorial scope. In Article 10, the law says, “The cause of ethnic unity and progress shall not be subject to interference by external forces. We firmly oppose all acts of infiltration, sabotage, slander, containment, and suppression of the People’s Republic of China in the name of ethnicity, religion, or human rights.” Article 63 is even more clear, saying, “Organizations and individuals outside the People’s Republic of China who engage in activities against the People’s Republic of China that undermine national unity and progress, or create ethnic division, shall be held legally accountable in accordance with the law.”

The PRC has over the past decade ramped up its use of transnational repression, and the new law adds additional tools that the CCP can use to undermine the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals outside, as well as inside, the PRC. The law effectively grants Chinese authorities jurisdiction over people who are not PRC citizens and are not living in the PRC but whose actions are deemed to “undermine national unity and progress.” The text is formulated to make its scope unlimited. Based on current and past patterns of CCP transnational repression, it is likely that Beijing will use the law against Tibetans living in exile, including those who are US, EU, or other citizens. Additionally, the new law directly contravenes established principles of international law, including territorial sovereignty of the relevant state and international human rights guarantees. This long-arm jurisdiction is comparable to the [Hong Kong National Security Law](#), Article 38 of which says it will apply to “offences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.” Notably, the Hong Kong law received universal condemnation, with [the United States terming it “a dangerous precedent that threatens the human rights and fundamental freedoms of people all over the world.”](#)

New interpretation of “ethnic equality” as “integration”

The Tibetan people were given autonomous governance within the PRC precisely to legally protect their distinct identity and tradition. In the past, when Chinese authorities stressed ethnic “unity” while Tibetans were facing discriminatory policies, prominent Tibetans such as the [10th Panchen Lama and Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal](#) (also written as Phuntso Wangye) [insisted](#) on “equality” in order to achieve “unity.” The [Tibetan understanding of “equality” was that Tibetans would be considered equally](#) as Chinese individuals in their enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. The latter law clearly corroborates this in its Preface saying, “The implementation of ethnic regional autonomy embodies the spirit of the state fully respecting and guaranteeing the rights of various ethnic minorities to manage their own internal affairs, and reflects the state’s adherence to the principles of equality, unity, and common prosperity among all ethnic groups.”

Today, this new law formalizes the CCP interpretation of “equality” by disregarding all the constitutional provisions of affirmative policies towards Tibetans and integrating them with the majority Chinese community, while denying Tibetans their fundamental human rights. Such [an ethnic integration \(交融\) policy is designed to create a unified national identity, fulfilling Xi Jinping’s objective](#) of “forging a sense of community for the Chinese nation.” The 2009 White Paper on [“China’s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups”](#) also hinted at this new definition of “equality” saying, “...citizens of *all ethnic groups* are equal before the law, enjoying the same rights and performing the same duties.” (italics added)

The new law's Article 5 asserts that "all ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal" and the dire warning that "discrimination and oppression against any ethnic group are prohibited." This formulation could imply that any action committed by Tibetans that appear to exclude Chinese individuals, whether in the field of culture, religion or way of life, can be termed as violating the law.

Stipulating Cultural Revolution-type surveillance within the family

Another highly problematic clause in the new law calls for Cultural Revolution-style surveillance within families. Article 20 mandates that "Parents or other guardians of minors shall fulfill their family education responsibilities in accordance with the law, educating and guiding minors to love the Communist Party of China, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation, fostering the concept of the Chinese nation as one family, and refraining from instilling in minors ideas that are detrimental to national unity and progress." The CCP further seeks to enlist children to monitor their parents' educational efforts. Article 54 is explicit -- "Citizens have the right to complain and report acts that undermine ethnic unity and progress; they have the right to report acts of state organs and their personnel that fail to perform or incorrectly perform their statutory duties in strengthening the sense of the Chinese national community and promoting ethnic unity and progress. For violations of this Law that undermine national unity and progress, or harm national or social interests, the People's Procuratorate may, in accordance with the law, issue procuratorial recommendations or initiate public interest litigation." This stipulation on reporting within the family violates China's 2021 [Personal Information Protection Law](#) which stipulates that "personal information of an individual" can only be processed after the "individual's consent has been obtained."

This law encourages indoctrinating even Tibetan preschool children, including imposition of Chinese language teaching through textbooks with CCP ideology (Article 15), and interferes in the protected spheres of family and privacy. The totalitarian intent of this provision contravenes Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it violates basic principles of the right to privacy. It also violates Articles 3, 16 and 36 of the UNCRD, to which China is a state party.

The clause represents a painful resurrection of the Cultural Revolution experience, when reporting within families to ensure political loyalty, including children turning on their parents, was not only encouraged, but enforced.

New ethnic policy reflects fundamental CCP agenda and predates Xi Jinping

The new law has most likely been pushed aggressively by President Xi Jinping who is regarded by almost all observers as the architect of the broader Sinicization policy, including in Tibet. Xi has sought to eliminate potential threats to the state and to the CCP by consolidating power under the Party. Xi has notably brought the ethnic and religious arms of government (formerly under State administration) under direct Party rule, expanded Party education and discipline and adopted a strict ethnic assimilation stance. The Party has also begun to roll out policies that nominally erase ethnic difference and promote a national narrative of ethnic unity centered on Chinese culture. However, Xi is merely the catalyst of the current initiative, and research reveals that forced assimilation of ethnic minorities into the Chinese nation is fundamentally a long-standing CCP objective.

The CCP initially appeared to support ethnic communities maintaining their distinct identities. In 1957, [Premier Zhou Enlai was quoted as saying](#): "If assimilation is one ethnic

group using force to destroy another ethnic group, this is reactionary; yet if assimilation is each ethnic group naturally fusing together in search of common prosperity, this is progress.”

Then, around the same time as the most recent round of Sino-Tibetan dialogue process began in 2002, a CCP-encouraged “debate” began within Chinese academic circles about rethinking ethnic policy. This work continued a political campaign launched by Peking University sociologist [Ma Rong in 2000](#). Ma advocated the elimination of any minority status and favored a model of ethnic assimilation whereby any tie between a minority group and a region should be gradually weakened. [Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe](#) from Tsinghua University also publicly promoted the integration of ethnic groups.

Around that time, Chinese authorities also started redefining the term “minzu” (民族) in English from the existing “nationality” to “ethnic” as a way to alter the international community’s narrative. China sought to eliminate any connotation of the term “nationality” to mean a separate political entity from that of the Chinese nation-state. Thus, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy became Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. Ma had recommended to authorities that they should change the term in Chinese to “zuquan” (族群) instead of minzu.

The call for assimilation was known as the second-generation ethnic policy. Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe’s second-generation policy “...is to promote the intermingling of all groups as a single body to advance the prosperity and to develop a great rejuvenation of the single unity of the Chinese nation.” The fact that this debate had official sanction can be seen from statements by senior Chinese officials in subsequent years that indicated the CCP was considering altering ethnic policies.

In the authoritative “Seeking Truth” journal of the CCP, [Jia Qinglin](#), member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference published an article titled “Resolutely resolve ethnic problems with Chinese characteristics on December 16, 2010, calling for “a new chapter of adhering to the correct path of solving ethnic problems with Chinese characteristics at the new historical starting point.” [Observers](#) saw that “[new chapter](#)” was indicating a new future direction of ethnic policy. Then in February 2012, [Zhu Weiqun, Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China](#), published a signed article “Some Thoughts on Current Issues in the Ethnic Minority Area,” in Study Times, the official journal of the Central Party School, suggesting that major adjustments should be made to ethnic policy. Zhu gave a warning, “Where there is an ethnic group, there is ethnic consciousness, and as long as an ethnic group exists, its consciousness will not disappear.” Zhu continued, “We cannot allow any ethnic consciousness to supersede national consciousness and the national consciousness of the Chinese nation, as this is detrimental to national unity and could even become a breeding ground for separatist ideologies.”

New ethnic policies’ impact on Tibet

An analysis of the evolution of this new ethnic policy as outlined by the law shows that Chinese authorities used the Tibetan community to test and fine-tune this coercive assimilationist policy for more than a decade before formalizing it at the national level through this new law. The law reflects the culmination of Xi Jinping’s focus on consolidating power in the party and eliminating threats, as well as the ideas of a new generation of ethnic policy thinkers who advocate the dilution of ethnic identity. It prescribes the coercive

assimilation of Tibetans and therefore further undermines Tibetans' fundamental freedom to preserve their unique culture, religion and way of life.

The dialogue process that envoys of the Dalai Lama have had with the Chinese government for resolving the Tibetan issue is based on PRC guarantees upheld by the PRC constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, among other laws and agreements. This was officially conveyed to Chinese authorities by the Dalai Lama's envoys in 2008 in what is known as "[Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy For the Tibetan People](#)", which said, "The uniqueness of the Tibetan situation has consistently been recognised within the PRC and has been reflected in the terms of the '17 Point Agreement' and in statements and policies of successive leaders of the PRC since then, and should remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC. The Constitution reflects a fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special characteristics and needs of minority nationalities."

A turning point in the Chinese government's posture came in 2008, when protests against repressive Chinese policies erupted across the Tibetan plateau, as well as among Tibetan diaspora communities worldwide. Examining the timeline of CCP statements after the pan-Tibetan protests, authorities likely concluded that forced integration and assimilation of those who are considered "ethnic minorities" would be the lasting solution to ethnic problems. A series of initiatives came forth thereafter aimed at changing China's ethnic policy to focus on assimilation rather than autonomy. The process of legalizing the assimilation policy was also first experimented on the Tibetans. In 2009, The Regulations on Ethnic Unity and Progress by the PRC was discussed in the Tibetan area in present-day Yunnan, with the Dechen (Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture setting up a leading group and working group to draft it. The regulations became law in Dechen in May 2010. Article 9 of the regulations says, "The people's governments of states and counties shall advocate and encourage exchanges and *integration among ethnic groups...*" (italics added).

The Dechen regulations have been followed by several similar regulations at the prefectural levels in several Tibetan areas, including in Kardze (Ganzi) in Sichuan; Malho (Huangnan), Tsojang (Haibei), Tsolho (Hainan), Tsonub (Haixi), and Yulshul (Yushu) in Qinghai. At the provincial level Qinghai and the Tibet Autonomous Region passed similar regulations in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Highlighting how the Tibetans were being used to test this transformation in ethnic policy, in January 2020 China promulgated "Regulations on the Creation of a Model Region for National Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region."

Notably, there was international concern in 2020 when the TAR regulations were passed, including by then-Senator and current [US Secretary of State Marco Rubio](#) who termed it "an explicit statement of the Chinese Communist Party's remaking of Tibetan culture," adding, "Ultimately, the CCP is enforcing a party-approved mold in order to reinforce the party's control of Tibetan society... As the Chinese Communist Party continues its attempts to wipe out Tibetan culture, the US and freedom loving nations should condemn the blatant violations of human rights."

Similarly, in May 2020, the then-High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell responded to a question by MEP Isabel Santos on the TAR ethnic unity law saying, "The EU has repeatedly raised its strong concerns about restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and on the rights of minorities in Tibet, both in EU-China bilateral meetings

and publicly, including in multilateral fora.” MEP Santos’ question was prefaced with, “The International Campaign for Tibet revealed how the ‘ethnic unity’ legislation recently adopted in Tibet will further erode the fundamental liberties of Tibetans and infringe their human rights.”

Comparative study of the text of the ethnic unity law with the regulations of the Tibet Autonomous Region

The goal of “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” -- which is the diplomatic way of referring to assimilation and integration of ethnic groups into a broader Chinese identity -- is present in Article 3 of both the ethnic unity law and the TAR regulations. The ethnic unity law presents it through an injunction that “we must guide the people of all ethnic groups to firmly establish the concept of a community of shared weal and woe” while in the TAR regulations this is highlighted as “a strategic task for Tibet’s work.” In fact, “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” and “equality among all ethnic groups” are common refrains in all the ethnic unity and progress regulations in the Tibetan areas.

The reference to Sinicization of religion in the TAR regulations (Article 17) is not present in the new law. The national law says that the state “...guides people of all ethnic groups to firmly establish a correct view of the country, history, nation, culture, and religion.” (Article 12). This change could be to soften the impact of the international focus on China’s Sinicization of religion at the national level, while having space to clamp down on Tibetan Buddhism, which the CCP sees as a threat to its survival.

While the new law is clear in maintaining that “all ethnic groups” are “equal” (Article 5), the TAR version is somewhat circumspect saying that people should have “a particularly sincere love for the people of all ethnic groups...” (Article 41).

On the matter of national security and its connections to ethnic groups, the TAR regulations clearly say in Article 18, “The autonomous region implements the overall national security concept” while the national law makes the reference broader saying the authorities will “safeguard national security”.

Recommendations

The international community should urge the Chinese government to review its laws on ethnic minorities to ensure adherence to international law and China’s international human rights commitments. In particular, the Chinese government at all levels should safeguard the principle of meaningful autonomy and self-determination, particularly with regard to the free pursuance of cultural preservation and the upholding of Tibet’s unique identity.

To the Government of the People’s Republic of China:

- Reinstatement of the legal provisions of the Constitution and the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy which enable Tibetans to have the freedom to preserve and promote their language, culture and way of life, including safeguarding the use of the Tibetan language as a medium of instruction, and immediately annul the provisions of the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law which contradict these prior provisions and run contrary to China’s international commitments.

- Incorporate the voice of the Tibetan people in the drafting of the five-year plans. Chinese state media had reported on Xi “emphasizing the importance of listening to the “voice of the people” “in the plan.
- Ensure that promotion of “nationality unity” does not restrict public debate over issues such as culture, linguistic preservation, education and traditional ways of life in Tibetan areas.
- Comply with its international obligations, including UN treaties ensuring that “ethnic minorities” have access to instruction in their mother tongues and have the right to exercise and preserve their unique cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions.
- Comply, in particular, with guarantees stipulated in the UNCRC, in particular Articles 3, 16 and 36 of the Convention.

To other governments:

- Express serious concern at the intent and consequences of the new law, which emphasizes coercive assimilation over cultural preservation and violates Tibetans’ rights under both China’s constitution and international law.
- Clearly articulate the threat posed by the new law and activate like-minded countries to engage the PRC bilaterally and within international fora.
- Specifically include the protection of Tibetan language and culture in their diplomatic and human rights dialogues with China. Call on China to adhere to the international human rights treaties to which it is a state party, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UNCRC, which protects the linguistic rights of minority children.
- Reaffirm the established rights of the Tibetan people to mother-tongue instruction in schools.
- Urge the Chinese government to refrain from acts of transnational repression against Tibetans and others residing outside Tibet and China and offer protection to those affected by transnational repression.
- Provide support to programs for Tibetans in exile, including for cultural and linguistic preservation.

To relevant treaty bodies and Special Procedures of the United Nations:

- Urge China to ratify and implement Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which says, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”

- Urge China to provide Tibetan-language instruction to Tibetans in accordance with its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which China ratified in 1992. Article 29 says “States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to” the development of “his or her own cultural identity, language and values.” Article 30 says, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.”
- Raise the threat to cultural rights resulting from the “Law on Ethnic Unity and Progress” with the Chinese government, in private and public communication, through joint letters, public statements and before the United Nations Human Rights Council.
- Urge the Chinese government to comply with guarantees stipulated in the UNCRC, in particular Articles 3, 16 and 36 of the Convention.



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