{"id":12835,"date":"2022-10-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-10-27T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/savetibet.nl\/nieuws\/chinas-20th-party-congress-intensification-of-security-and-assimilation\/"},"modified":"2022-10-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2022-10-27T22:00:00","slug":"chinas-20th-party-congress-intensification-of-security-and-assimilation","status":"publish","type":"nieuws","link":"https:\/\/savetibet.nl\/en\/news\/chinas-20th-party-congress-intensification-of-security-and-assimilation\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s 20th Party Congress: intensification of security and assimilation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held between 16 and 22 October 2022, laid out priorities for the next five years that will profoundly impact the lives of the Tibetans living under China\u2019s rule. The Party Congress deflated the little optimism that some had for political liberalization, as it regressed all the major political reforms in China in the post-Mao period. Xi Jinping begins his third term in office with an indefinite tenure and a firm grip on power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While no new policy guidelines were introduced during the Congress, Xi Jinping made clear his priorities and intensification of the existing policies, as well as the central task of the CCP. In Xi\u2019s own words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From this day forward, the central task of the Communist Party of China will be to lead the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in a concerted effort to realize the Second Centenary Goal of building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects and to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts through a Chinese path to modernization.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

From the trends observed in the past decade of Xi\u2019s rule and the goals set for the future, it is highly discernable that the Tibetans as an \u201cethnic minority\u201d in China will undergo intensified and accelerated assimilation and heavy ideological indoctrination during Xi\u2019s indefinite rule. The uptick on security, nationalism and repression since 2012, when China\u2019s \u201cNew Era\u201d officially began, is indicative of the worsening of situation in the remaining 27 years of the \u201cNew Era\u201d until the second centenary goal is achieved by 2049.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Key words analysis<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

An analysis of key words in Xi Jinping\u2019s political work report to the 20th Party Congress reveal that China\u2019s decades-old policy planks of security and development remain unchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the focus on security has increased sharply when the 20th Party Congress report is compared to the 19th Party Congress report from 2017. The word \u201csecurity\u201d appears 80 times in the 20th report (English version) versus 43 in the 19th Congress report. The frequency of the term \u201cnational security\u201d in particular has increased to 29 against 14 in the 19th Congress report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The International Campaign for Tibet notes that Beijing has started to frame Tibet as a national security issue<\/a>, with Xi Jinping building an all-encompassing national security framework since the third plenum (meeting of the party central committee, China\u2019s third highest body, the other two being the Politburo and Politburo standing committee) of the 18th Party Congress in 2013. The increased emphasis on national security in the 20th Congress report is expected to inevitably lead to firmer security policies in Tibet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another notable theme in the 20th Congress Report is nationalism. This is reflected in increased frequency of the terms \u201cunity\u201d and \u201cChinese nation.\u201d Unity is mentioned 21 times (41 in the Chinese version) against 17, whereas Chinese nation is mentioned 25times (26 in Chinese) versus 21 times in the 20th and 19th Party Congress reports respectively. In the background of a stagnating Chinese economy following three decades of double-digit GDP growth and worsened by sweeping COVID lockdowns, the party\u2019s turn toward nationalism aims to offset its decline in legitimacy in the shadow of an anticipated declining economy. Shoring up nationalism as its legitimacy currency appears to lead to widening the gap between Han Chinese and Tibetans and potentially increased Chinese hate toward \u201cminorities\u201d like Tibetans as collateral damage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Parsing through the political discourse, past and present, there is little doubt that Tibetans and others who are categorized as \u201cethnic minorities\u201d will be coerced into becoming \u201csons and daughters of the Chinese nation\u201d and developing \u201ca strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.\u201d In calling for strengthening \u201cthe great unity of the Chinese people of all ethnic groups and the great unity of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation\u201d for the \u201cChina Dream\u201d of the \u201crejuvenation of the Chinese nation,\u201d the policy guideline is meant to accelerate the assimilation of Tibetans and other minorities under CCP rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rural revitalization strategy launched at the 19th Congress is reiterated in Xi\u2019s work report to the 20th Congress as well. According to Xi, \u201cadvancing rural revitalization across the board is the most challenging and arduous tasks we face in building a modern socialist China in all respects remain in our rural areas.\u201d Large-scale development of the western region by placing \u201csound systems, mechanisms, and policies for promoting integrated urban-rural development\u201d was instructed to the delegates of the 20th Congress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This will have an impact on Tibet. The party claims that the rural revitalization strategy<\/a> empowers rural residents to become shareholders in cooperatives by consolidating their properties to attract investors. Although in theory the farmers maintain their land tenure rights, even though all rural land legally belongs to the state, wealthy Chinese investors\u2019 factories degrade the soil and make the farmers\u2019 finances unsustainable once they pull out their investment after their profit margins drop. The urban-rural integration development model at the heart of rural revitalization strategy is an unsustainable development model in the long run which keeps the farmers poor but the rich richer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Tibet, rural revitalization strategy is pointedly political. In days prior to and during the 20th Congress, recruitment notices for rural revitalization cadres listed political criteria for fresh college graduate job aspirants. The rural revitalization cadre recruitment notices for Shigatse<\/a> (Chinese: Rikaze), Lhasa<\/a> (Lasa) and Nagchu<\/a> (Naqu) required applicants to be \u201canti-Dalai Lama,\u201d \u201copposing separatism,\u201d \u201canti-Dalai clique\u201d and \u201csafeguarding the motherland\u2019s reunification.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Leaders with roles impacting Tibet<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Wang Huning: Ideologue in Chief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indoctrination of Tibetans and assimilation of Tibetans in the \u201cChinese nation\u201d have been the perpetual goal of the CCP for decades through both hard and soft methods. During Xi\u2019s unprecedented third term and beyond, there is little doubt that the pace of indoctrination and assimilation will accelerate to an unseen level. The 20th Congress sent multiple signals to this effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With China\u2019s ideologue in chief, Wang Huning, who was the fourth to walk up to the stage during the new top party leadership revelation event, the expectation is that he will be overseeing the party\u2019s United Front and ethnic policies. It is almost certain that Wang will be declared the new Chairman of the Chinese People\u2019s Political Conference (CPPCC) during the upcoming \u201ctwo sessions\u201d in spring 2023. As the CCP\u2019s Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of the United Front and Chairman of the CPPCC, Wang Huning directs China\u2019s Central Committee Tibet Work Coordination Group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China watchers observe that Wang Huning is the chief ideologue of the Communist Party<\/a> and the architect of political ideologies of the Party leaders. The former academic was recruited into the party in the mid-1990s by Jiang Zemin\u2019s \u201cShanghai Gang,\u201d a rival faction of Xi Jinping. Wang\u2019s rise and retention of his leadership position serving under three paramount leaders of rival factions is testament to his political shrewdness and accomplishments in three decades. He was promoted as one of the Politburo standing committee members during the 19th Party Congress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Wang Huning takes the CCP\u2019s number four position, his relatively liberal predecessor and a member of the diminished Communist Youth League, Wang Yang, was demoted after serving one term in the highest decision-making body. Once speculated to be the next premier of China, Wang Yang did not even find a spot in the 205 member-strong central committee of the CCP. In a clear indication of dissatisfaction with Wang Yang\u2019s work, the official party mouthpiece People\u2019s Daily<\/a> on 25 October said that, \u201cThe leadership positions of the Party and the state are not \u2018iron chairs,\u2019 and those who meet the age requirements do not necessarily need to continue to be nominated.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shi Taifeng: New Head of United Front Work Department<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the United Front Work Department (UFWD) plays a pivotal role in the Party\u2019s policies on Tibet, it is interesting to see that the newly-inducted politburo member Shi Taifeng was appointed as the new head of UFWD. His appointment came a week after the Party Congress ended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shi\u2019s appointment as the new head of the UFWD indicates intensified hardline policies on Tibetans<\/a> and other \u201cethnic minorities\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He was appointed the Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 2019 to execute Xi\u2019s plan to tighten control over the frontier region. During his leadership as the Party Secretary, student protests erupted in Inner Mongolia<\/a> to protect Mongolian culture and language. Shi\u2019s order for Chinese medium instruction and textbooks in schools resulted in students and parents protests over the policy implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pan Yue: The rising ideologue<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the months leading up to the 20th Party Congress, the CCP sent a clear signal of its policy priority for China\u2019s \u201cethnic minorities.\u201d In June 2022, a rising ideologue, Pan Yue, was appointed<\/a> as the Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission. The commission under the United Front Work Department since 2018 oversees affairs relating to China\u2019s \u201cethnic minorities.\u201d After 1954, when Li Weihan, the first ethnic Chinese, completed his tenure, Pan Yue is only the third head of the Commission who is of ethnic Chinese origin. In between seven others were from \u201cethnic minority\u201d communities. Pan Yue succeeded the second ethnic Chinese head, Chen Xiaojiang, who was appointed as the head in December 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of his new designation, Pan continues to hold his titles as the Deputy Minister of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee and as Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council since 2020. Pan Yue\u2019s rise is notable as he was elevated to the Central Committee of the CCP during the 20th Congress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pan Yue is an ideologue focused on justifying expansion of China and assimilation of peoples as integration into China. His essays (part 1<\/a> and 2<\/a>) published prior to his appointment as the Director of the NEAC reasons the superiority of Chinese civilization over Western civilizations due to its \u201cintegration\u201d pull. Contrasting ancient European empires to the Chinese empire, he wrote, \u201cEuropean barbarians practiced ethnic division, coupled with religious contradictions, which intensified ethnic estrangement, resulting in the continuous differentiation of ethnic groups.\u201d Citing another Chinese author, he justifies the superiority of China as expansion by integration whereas disintegration of Europe since the Greek empire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since his appointment as the Director of the NEAC, Pan Yue repeatedly stresses \u201cforging a sense of community of the Chinese nation and strengthening the construction of the community of the Chinese nation\u201d during his official presence at \u201cethnic minority\u201d events. There is little doubt that his goal is to drive and \u201cintegrate\u201d Tibetans and other minority cultures into Chinese culture in the Chinese nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Party Secretaries in the Central Committee directly impacting lives of Tibetans<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Party Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region, Wang Junzheng, is included in the Central Committee of the CCP per the precedent of having the TAR Party Secretary in the Central Committee. Wang served as an alternate member of the Central Committee during the 19th Congress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Party Secretaries of Qinghai (where most of Amdo area of Tibet is located) Xin Changxing, Sichuan (parts of Kham and Amdo area are incorporated) Wang Xiaohui, Gansu (part of Amdo is incorporated) Yin Hong, and Yunnan (part of Kham area of Tibet is incorporated) Wang Ning also find a place in the 20th Party Central Committee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tibetans in the top leadership<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the CCP\u2019s leadership pyramid, ethnic Chinese leaders sweepingly dominate the all-powerful Politburo standing committee and the larger Politburo. However, nine \u201cethnic minorities\u201d were included in the 205 member-strong Central Committee of the CCP. Tibet Autonomous Region Chairman Yan Jinhai\u2014who according to his official biography is a Tibetan\u2014is the only Tibetan in the Central Committee. In the 19th Party Congress there were two Tibetans in the Central Committee. Contrary to expectations, Norbu Thondup, who was an alternate in the 19th Party Congress did not find a place in the 20th Party Congress lineup.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three other Tibetans were listed in the 171 alternate members of the Central Committee. No Tibetan leaders from Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan were included. The Tibetan alternate members of the Central Committee are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n