{"id":10899,"date":"2026-03-13T12:47:48","date_gmt":"2026-03-13T11:47:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/savetibet.nl\/?post_type=nieuws&p=10899"},"modified":"2026-04-20T10:57:38","modified_gmt":"2026-04-20T08:57:38","slug":"new-prc-ethnic-unity-and-progress-law-enforces-assimilation-of-tibetans","status":"publish","type":"nieuws","link":"https:\/\/savetibet.nl\/en\/news\/new-prc-ethnic-unity-and-progress-law-enforces-assimilation-of-tibetans\/","title":{"rendered":"New PRC ethnic unity and progress law enforces assimilation of Tibetans"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On 12 March 2026, the National People\u2019s Congress (NPC) passed<\/a> the new law of the People\u2019s Republic of China on \u201cPromoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.\u201d<\/a> The legislation advances a PRC strategy of demographic homogenization for Tibetans and other non-Chinese peoples behind anodyne language that ostensibly \u201chelps better support people of all ethnic groups across the country in advancing national development and rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization.\u201dSeveral provisions in the law serve to legitimize Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies forcing Tibetans and others to assimilate into the CCP-defined \u201cChinese\u201d nation, according to analysis by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). The law provides a legal tool for the CCP to establish and enforce a unified national identity and singular idea of China, shaped by CCP and authoritarian ideology. While the regulations refer to non-discrimination in recruitment and the right to criticize discriminatory practices, they impose a top-down vision of \u201cethnic unity\u201d which upholds Chinese ethnic identity as the norm. Most importantly, and for the first time, the regulations represent an explicit legal departure from the principle of preferential treatment of people like Tibetans considered a \u201cminority\u201d as stipulated in the PRC Constitution and relevant laws.The assertion of a dominant ethnic culture violates international human rights law<\/a> and China\u2019s international human rights commitments, including provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which China ratified in 1981, and of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which China ratified in 1992. The regulations also violate the right to freely pursue social and cultural development, pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which China ratified in 2001. Furthermore, the law\u2019s international scope raises fears of an intensified strategy of transnational repression on the global stage perpetrated by the CCP against dissenting voices in other countries.The law has significant ramifications for Tibet and the Tibetan people. Tibetans were an integral factor in the design of this law as evidenced by the similar \u201cRegulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region\u201d<\/a> promulgated in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, and, in different iterations, at the sub-provincial level in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai provinces. ICT compared the text of this legislation with some of the regulations in Tibetan areas formulated in prior years and examined statements by current and former Chinese leaders on ethnic issues, as well as the \u201cpublic debate\u201d among CCP-aligned scholars on altering ethnic minority policies. The comparative analysis demonstrated that the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law is the culmination of a decades-long CCP effort to dilute the unique identity of the Tibetan people and codify forced assimilationist policies into the PRC\u2019s legal framework. A 2025 analysis by ICT shows how the CCP has used Tibet as a testing ground for the policy that led to this new law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Download the full analysis as a PDF here of read it below.<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Reversal of CCP policy on \u201cminority\u201d ethnic groups<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

This law reverses the long-stated CCP commitment, dating to the era of Mao Zedong, to recognize the distinct culture and tradition of \u201cethnic minorities\u201d through autonomous governance initiatives. Even before the establishment of the PRC, the CCP committed to addressing the issue of the non-Chinese \u201cminority\u201d communities through an autonomous governance system. In October 1936, Mao Zedong\u2019s then revolutionary government encouraged the establishment of the Yuwang Hui Autonomous Government<\/a>, the first such governance system. The Hui are one of the 55 ethnic groups, along with Tibetans, recognized as a \u201cminority\u201d by the CCP. In September 1949, after assuming power, the CCP listed ethnic regional autonomy as a political system in the Common Program of the Chinese People\u2019s Political Consultative Conference<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly, the Constitution of the PRC provided the highest legal guarantee to \u201cminority\u201d ethnic communities by mandating that \u201c[r]egional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority ethnicities live in concentrated communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the power of autonomy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, at least on paper, the PRC governs Tibetans and other \u201cminorities\u201d under an autonomous structure with more privileges than the governance system in the majority Chinese areas, in order to preserve and promote their culture, religion, language and way of life. This policy was codified in the Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy<\/a>. This Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law says: \u201cThe implementation of ethnic regional autonomy embodies the spirit of the state, fully respecting and guaranteeing the rights of various ethnic minorities to manage their own internal affairs.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On a surface level, the \u201cEthnic Unity and Progress Law\u201d does not stipulate eliminating the autonomy system, yet its provisions directly or indirectly unravel and undermine both the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and the underlying constitutional guarantee. Consequently, in real terms, the Ethnic Unity and Progress law will override the PRC\u2019s autonomy laws, including through redefining clauses to serve its policy of forced assimilation and advancing a homogenous Chinese nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Linguistic rights is one example of this troubling dynamic. According to the Constitution (Articles 4 and 121) and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (articles 10, 21, 37, 49), the Tibetan people have the right to preserve and promote the Tibetan language and PRC policy is supposed to support this. To guarantee the right of \u201cethnic minorities\u201d to use their native spoken and written languages in legal proceedings, Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Law<\/a> prescribes: \u201cCitizens of all ethnic groups shall have the right to use their native spoken and written languages in civil proceedings. Where people of an ethnic minority live in a concentrated community or where a number of ethnic groups live together in one area, the people\u2019s courts shall conduct hearings and issue legal documents in the spoken and written languages commonly used by the local ethnic groups. The people\u2019s courts shall provide translations for any participant in the court proceedings who is not familiar with the spoken or written languages commonly used by the local ethnic groups.\u201d The Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, however, reverses this commitment by providing leeway to Chinese authorities not to take any initiatives to promote the Tibetan language in Tibet. Article 15 of the Ethnic Unity and Progress law says the state shall promote written and spoken Chinese and, even if a non-Chinese language is to be used, the state should \u201cgive priority to the national standard spoken and written Chinese language and script.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Redefining the role of ethnic groups in China<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cEthnic Unity and Progress Law\u201d mandates that ethnic groups should now build a \u201ccommunity for the Chinese nation\u201d and in the process make their own distinct identity and culture subservient to it. The preface of the law says that the CCP \u201chas made forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation the main line of the Party\u2019s ethnic work and the main focus of all work in ethnic minority areas.\u201d This is further emphasized in Article 6, which says, \u201cThe sense of community for the Chinese nation is the foundation of national unity.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The sense of community for the Chinese nation (\u4e2d\u534e\u6c11\u65cf\u5171\u540c\u4f53\u610f\u8bc6) is a political concept introduced by President Xi Jinping for a unified, shared identity among all ethnic groups. Making his objective clear at the 2019 National Conference on Commending Models for Ethnic Unity and Progress, Xi Jinping mentioned<\/a> that the \u201chistory of China is a history of the integration and convergence of various ethnic groups into a unified multi-ethnic Chinese nation, a history of all ethnic groups jointly creating, developing, and consolidating the great unified motherland,\u201d In other words, the CCP\u2019s ethnic theory and ethnic policy will now be a vehicle for the \u201cSinicization\u201d of Tibetans and other non-Chinese communities.\u202fThe Tibetan-specific objective was made clear when the head of the Chinese United Front Work Department, Li Ganjie, met the CCP-selected Panchen Lama on February 12, 2026 in Beijing<\/a> and expressed the hope that he \u201cwould strengthen his sense of community for the Chinese nation and actively participate in the building of the Chinese nation as a community\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With this change, ethnic groups within the PRC are tasked with obeying the leadership of the CCP as a principal means for advancing \u201cethnic unity.\u201d Article 2 of the new law states: \u201cThe cause of ethnic unity and progress must adhere to the overall leadership of the Communist Party of China\u2026\u201d It continues saying, \u201cThis will consolidate the common ideological and political foundation for the unity and struggle of all ethnic groups and gather strength for building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Ethnic policy now directly linked to national security<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the PRC Constitution and the Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy focused on preserving and promoting distinct ethnic identities and traditions, the new law views minority communities including Tibetans solely through a national security lens. Article 52<\/a> specifically lists \u201csafeguard national security and social stability\u201d among the responsibilities of governmental organs at all levels in its approach to ethnic communities. Xi Jinping has redefined \u201cnational security\u201d to encompass all issues, and the new law gives a national security-centric approach to addressing ethnic issues. Article 50 of the law identifies safeguarding national security as a responsibility of the authorities in their approach to ethnic groups. This approach complements the PRC\u2019s application of the 2015 National Security Law<\/a>, which mandates \u201clawfully punishing activities that divide ethnicities to preserve social tranquility and the unity of the motherland in ethnic regions\u2026,\u201d and it legalizes the intent of the National Security Education Guideline<\/a> announced in September 2020 to politically train an entire new generation of vigilant guards across China. The Guideline portrays minorities, including Tibetans and Uyghurs, as dangerous and untrustworthy. Members of minority communities are implied to be threats to national security, territorial integrity, national unity, political stability and social order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Extraterritorial scope risks transnational repression<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the most problematic features of the new law, in terms of the international community, is its extraterritorial scope. In Article 10, the law says, \u201cThe cause of ethnic unity and progress shall not be subject to interference by external forces. We firmly oppose all acts of infiltration, sabotage, slander, containment, and suppression of the People\u2019s Republic of China in the name of ethnicity, religion, or human rights.\u201d Article 63 is even more clear, saying, \u201cOrganizations and individuals outside the People\u2019s Republic of China who engage in activities against the People\u2019s Republic of China that undermine national unity and progress, or create ethnic division, shall be held legally accountable in accordance with the law.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The PRC has over the past decade ramped up its use of transnational repression, and the new law adds additional tools that the CCP can use to undermine the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals outside, as well as inside, the PRC. The law effectively grants Chinese authorities jurisdiction over people who are not PRC citizens and are not living in the PRC but whose actions are deemed to \u201cundermine national unity and progress.\u201d The text is formulated to make its scope unlimited. Based on current and past patterns of CCP transnational repression, it is likely that Beijing will use the law against Tibetans living in exile, including those who are US, EU, or other citizens. Additionally, the new law directly contravenes established principles of international law, including territorial sovereignty of the relevant state and international human rights guarantees. This long-arm jurisdiction is comparable to the Hong Kong National Security Law<\/a>, Article 38 of which says it will apply to \u201coffences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.\u201d Notably, the Hong Kong law received universal condemnation, with the United States terming it \u201ca dangerous precedent that threatens the human rights<\/a> and fundamental freedoms of people all over the world.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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New interpretation of \u201cethnic equality\u201d as \u201cintegration\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Tibetan people were given autonomous governance within the PRC precisely to legally protect their distinct identity and tradition. In the past, when Chinese authorities stressed ethnic \u201cunity\u201d while Tibetans were facing discriminatory policies, prominent Tibetans such as the 10th Panchen Lama and Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal<\/a> (also written as Phuntso Wangye) insisted<\/a> on \u201cequality\u201d in order to achieve \u201cunity.\u201d The Tibetan understanding of \u201cequality\u201d was that Tibetans would be considered equally<\/a> as Chinese individuals in their enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. The latter law clearly corroborates this in its Preface saying, \u201cThe implementation of ethnic regional autonomy embodies the spirit of the state fully respecting and guaranteeing the rights of various ethnic minorities to manage their own internal affairs, and reflects the state\u2019s adherence to the principles of equality, unity, and common prosperity among all ethnic groups.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, this new law formalizes the CCP interpretation of \u201cequality\u201d by disregarding all the constitutional provisions of affirmative policies towards Tibetans and integrating them with the majority Chinese community, while denying Tibetans their fundamental human rights. Such an ethnic integration (\u4ea4\u878d) policy is designed to create a unified national identity, fulfilling Xi Jinping\u2019s objective<\/a> of \u201cforging a sense of community for the Chinese nation.\u201d The 2009 White Paper on \u201cChina\u2019s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups\u201d<\/a> also hinted at this new definition of \u201cequality\u201d saying, \u201c\u2026citizens of all ethnic groups<\/em> are equal before the law, enjoying the same rights and performing the same duties.\u201d (italics added)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new law\u2019s Article 5 asserts that \u201call ethnic groups in the People\u2019s Republic of China are equal\u201d and the dire warning that \u201cdiscrimination and oppression against any ethnic group are prohibited.\u201d This formulation could imply that any action committed by Tibetans that appear to exclude Chinese individuals, whether in the field of culture, religion or way of life, can be termed as violating the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Stipulating Cultural Revolution-type surveillance within the family<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another highly problematic clause in the new law calls for Cultural Revolution-style surveillance within families. Article 20 mandates that \u201cParents or other guardians of minors shall fulfill their family education responsibilities in accordance with the law, educating and guiding minors to love the Communist Party of China, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation, fostering the concept of the Chinese nation as one family, and refraining from instilling in minors ideas that are detrimental to national unity and progress.\u201d The CCP further seeks to enlist children to monitor their parents\u2019 educational efforts. Article 54 is explicit \u2014 \u201cCitizens have the right to complain and report acts that undermine ethnic unity and progress; they have the right to report acts of state organs and their personnel that fail to perform or incorrectly perform their statutory duties in strengthening the sense of the Chinese national community and promoting ethnic unity and progress. For violations of this Law that undermine national unity and progress, or harm national or social interests, the People\u2019s Procuratorate may, in accordance with the law, issue procuratorial recommendations or initiate public interest litigation.\u201d This stipulation on reporting within the family violates China\u2019s 2021 Personal Information Protection Law<\/a> which stipulates that \u201cpersonal information of an individual\u201d can only be processed after the \u201cindividual\u2019s consent has been obtained.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This law encourages indoctrinating even Tibetan preschool children, including imposition of Chinese language teaching through textbooks with CCP ideology (Article 15), and interferes in the protected spheres of family and privacy. The totalitarian intent of this provision contravenes Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it violates basic principles of the right to privacy. It also violates Articles 3, 16 and 36 of the UNCRC, to which China is a state party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The clause represents a painful resurrection of the Cultural Revolution experience, when reporting within families to ensure political loyalty, including children turning on their parents, was not only encouraged, but enforced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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New ethnic policy reflects fundamental CCP agenda and predates Xi Jinping<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new law has most likely been pushed aggressively by President Xi Jinping who is regarded by almost all observers as the architect of the broader Sinicization policy, including in Tibet. Xi has sought to eliminate potential threats to the state and to the CCP by consolidating power under the Party. Xi has notably brought the ethnic and religious arms of government (formerly under State administration) under direct Party rule, expanded Party education and discipline and adopted a strict ethnic assimilation stance. The Party has also begun to roll out policies that nominally erase ethnic difference and promote a national narrative of ethnic unity centered on Chinese culture. However, Xi is merely the catalyst of the current initiative, and research reveals that forced assimilation of ethnic minorities into the Chinese nation is fundamentally a long-standing CCP objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The CCP initially appeared to support ethnic communities maintaining their distinct identities. In 1957, Premier Zhou Enlai was quoted as saying<\/a>: \u201cIf assimilation is one ethnic group using force to destroy another ethnic group, this is reactionary; yet if assimilation is each ethnic group naturally fusing together in search of common prosperity, this is progress.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then, around the same time as the most recent round of Sino-Tibetan dialogue process began in 2002, a CCP-encouraged \u201cdebate\u201d began within Chinese academic circles about rethinking ethnic policy. This work continued a political campaign launched by Peking University sociologist Ma Rong in 2000<\/a>. Ma advocated the elimination of any minority status and favored a model of ethnic assimilation whereby any tie between a minority group and a region should be gradually weakened. Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe<\/a> from Tsinghua University also publicly promoted the integration of ethnic groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Around that time, Chinese authorities also started redefining the term \u201cminzu\u201d (\u6c11\u65cf) in English from the existing \u201cnationality\u201d to \u201cethnic\u201d as a way to alter the international community\u2019s narrative. China sought to eliminate any connotation of the term \u201cnationality\u201d to mean a separate political entity from that of the Chinese nation-state. Thus, the Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy became Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. Ma had recommended to authorities that they should change the term in Chinese to \u201czuquan\u201d (\u65cf\u7fa4) instead of minzu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The call for assimilation was known as the second-generation ethnic policy. Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe\u2019s second-generation policy \u201c\u2026is to promote the intermingling of all groups as a single body to advance the prosperity and to develop a great rejuvenation of the single unity of the Chinese nation.\u201d The fact that this debate had official sanction can be seen from statements by senior Chinese officials in subsequent years that indicated the CCP was considering altering ethnic policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the authoritative \u201cSeeking Truth\u201d journal of the CCP, Jia Qinglin<\/a>, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People\u2019s Political Consultative Conference published an article titled \u201cResolutely resolve ethnic problems with Chinese characteristics on December 16, 2010, calling for \u201ca new chapter of adhering to the correct path of solving ethnic problems with Chinese characteristics at the new historical starting point.\u201d Observers<\/a> saw that \u201cnew chapter\u201d was indicating a new future direction of ethnic policy<\/a>. Then in February 2012, Zhu Weiqun, Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China<\/a>, published a signed article \u201cSome Thoughts on Current Issues in the Ethnic Minority Area,\u201d in Study Times, the official journal of the Central Party School, suggesting that major adjustments should be made to ethnic policy. Zhu gave a warning, \u201cWhere there is an ethnic group, there is ethnic consciousness, and as long as an ethnic group exists, its consciousness will not disappear.\u201d Zhu continued, \u201cWe cannot allow any ethnic consciousness to supersede national consciousness and the national consciousness of the Chinese nation, as this is detrimental to national unity and could even become a breeding ground for separatist ideologies.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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New ethnic policies\u2019 impact on Tibet<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

An analysis of the evolution of this new ethnic policy as outlined by the law shows that Chinese authorities used the Tibetan community to test and fine-tune this coercive assimilationist policy for more than a decade before formalizing it at the national level through this new law. The law reflects the culmination of Xi Jinping\u2019s focus on consolidating power in the party and eliminating threats, as well as the ideas of a new generation of ethnic policy thinkers who advocate the dilution of ethnic identity. It prescribes the coercive assimilation of Tibetans and therefore further undermines Tibetans\u2019 fundamental freedom to preserve their unique culture, religion and way of life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The dialogue process that envoys of the Dalai Lama have had with the Chinese government for resolving the Tibetan issue is based on PRC guarantees upheld by the PRC constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, among other laws and agreements. This was officially conveyed to Chinese authorities by the Dalai Lama\u2019s envoys in 2008 in what is known as \u201cMemorandum on Genuine Autonomy For the Tibetan People\u201d<\/a>, which said, \u201cThe uniqueness of the Tibetan situation has consistently been recognised within the PRC and has been reflected in the terms of the \u201817 Point Agreement\u2019 and in statements and policies of successive leaders of the PRC since then, and should remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC. The Constitution reflects a fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special characteristics and needs of minority nationalities.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A turning point in the Chinese government\u2019s posture came in 2008, when protests against repressive Chinese policies erupted across the Tibetan plateau, as well as among Tibetan diaspora communities worldwide. Examining the timeline of CCP statements after the pan-Tibetan protests, authorities likely concluded that forced integration and assimilation of those who are considered \u201cethnic minorities\u201d would be the lasting solution to ethnic problems. A series of initiatives came forth thereafter aimed at changing China\u2019s ethnic policy to focus on assimilation rather than autonomy. The process of legalizing the assimilation policy was also first experimented on the Tibetans. In 2009, The Regulations on Ethnic Unity and Progress by the PRC was discussed in the Tibetan area in present-day Yunnan, with the Dechen (Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture setting up a leading group and working group to draft it. The regulations became law in Dechen in May 2010. Article 9 of the regulations says, \u201cThe people\u2019s governments of states and counties shall advocate and encourage exchanges and integration among ethnic groups<\/em>\u2026\u201d (italics added).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Dechen regulations have been followed by several similar regulations at the prefectural levels in several Tibetan areas, including in Kardze (Ganzi) in Sichuan; Malho (Huangnan), Tsojang (Haibei), Tsolho (Hainan), Tsonub (Haixi), and Yulshul (Yushu) in Qinghai. At the provincial level Qinghai and the Tibet Autonomous Region passed similar regulations in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Highlighting how the Tibetans were being used to test this transformation in ethnic policy, in January 2020 China promulgated \u201cRegulations on the Creation of a Model Region for National Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autonomous Region.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notably, there was international concern in 2020 when the TAR regulations were passed, including by then-Senator and current US Secretary of State Marco Rubio<\/a> who termed it \u201can explicit statement of the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s remaking of Tibetan culture,\u201d adding, \u201cUltimately, the CCP is enforcing a party-approved mold in order to reinforce the party\u2019s control of Tibetan society\u2026 As the Chinese Communist Party continues its attempts to wipe out Tibetan culture, the US and freedom loving nations should condemn the blatant violations of human rights.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, in May 2020, the then-High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy\/Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell responded to a question by MEP Isabel Santos on the TAR ethnic unity law saying, \u201cThe EU has repeatedly raised its strong concerns about restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and on the rights of minorities in Tibet, both in EU-China bilateral meetings and publicly, including in multilateral fora.\u201d MEP Santos\u2019 question was prefaced with, \u201cThe International Campaign for Tibet revealed how the \u2018ethnic unity\u2019 legislation recently adopted in Tibet will further erode the fundamental liberties of Tibetans and infringe their human rights.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Comparative study of the text of the ethnic unity law with the regulations of the Tibet Autonomous Region<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The goal of \u201cforging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation\u201d \u2014 which is the diplomatic way of referring to assimilation and integration of ethnic groups into a broader Chinese identity \u2014 is present in Article 3 of both the ethnic unity law and the TAR regulations. The ethnic unity law presents it through an injunction that \u201cwe must guide the people of all ethnic groups to firmly establish the concept of a community of shared weal and woe\u201d while in the TAR regulations this is highlighted as \u201ca strategic task for Tibet\u2019s work.\u201d In fact, \u201cforging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation\u201d and \u201cequality among all ethnic groups\u201d are common refrains in all the ethnic unity and progress regulations in the Tibetan areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reference to Sinicization of religion in the TAR regulations (Article 17) is not present in the new law. The national law says that the state \u201c\u2026guides people of all ethnic groups to firmly establish a correct view of the country, history, nation, culture, and religion.\u201d (Article 12). This change could be to soften the impact of the international focus on China\u2019s Sinicization of religion at the national level, while having space to clamp down on Tibetan Buddhism, which the CCP sees as a threat to its survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the new law is clear in maintaining that \u201call ethnic groups\u201d are \u201cequal\u201d (Article 5), the TAR version is somewhat circumspect saying that people should have \u201ca particularly sincere love for the people of all ethnic groups\u2026\u201d (Article 41).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the matter of national security and its connections to ethnic groups, the TAR regulations clearly say in Article 18, \u201cThe autonomous region implements the overall national security concept\u201d while the national law makes the reference broader saying the authorities will \u201csafeguard national security\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The international community should urge the Chinese government to review its laws on ethnic minorities to ensure adherence to international law and China\u2019s international human rights commitments. In particular, the Chinese government at all levels should safeguard the principle of meaningful autonomy and self-determination, particularly with regard to the free pursuance of cultural preservation and the upholding of Tibet\u2019s unique identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To the Government of the People\u2019s Republic of China:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n